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NOTES

THE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF LARCENY
In order that property may be the subject matter of larceny, at common law,
it must have had a definite value.' The exact measure of this value that was necessary was never fixed, and, consequently, much discretion was left in the hands of
the courts, in determining whether a thing was of sufficient value to be the subject of the crime of larceny. This requirement has survived the many changes that
have taken place in the law and is today still essential to a conviction for larceny
wherever the common law controls, and in many cases where the indictment is
under a statute controlling larceny. One authority asserts:
"Inasmuch as larceny cannot, at common law, be committed of
things that have no value, it is essential, except und'er statutes making
of value, that it be
the taking of a particular thing larceny irrespective
2
shown that the property stolen had some value."
Another authority indicates that value is a requirement for an indictment
for larceny. It notes that only when a statute makes something the subject of
3
larceny irrespective of value is this not a requirement.
There is almost unanimous case support for the statements made in these
volumes. The court in a North Carolina case decided in 1815, said:
"An indictment which charges a person with stealing a thing destitute of both intrinsic and artificial value, cannot be supported." An indictment, therefore, which charged the defendant with larceny for
stealing a one-half ten-shilling bill for the currency of the state was quashed. The
court said that the state currency was "worthless," that is, had no value, so the
indictment fell. 4 An Oklahoma court, in 1904, said that the subject matter of
larceny had to have value, but what that value is, is only material when the offens'e
is graded by the value. The court added, however, that some value is always neces5
sary.
Larceny in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania has very few cases which deal with the value of the subject
matter of larceny, but these few clearly indicate that the common law of this state6
requires that a thing to be the subject of the crime of larceny must have value.
In Pennsylvania there are several statutes which make the taking of specific
things the subject of larceny, and there is one general statute which, in effect,
reenacts the common law in this state. The statute recites:
"Whoever commits larceny is guilty of a felony, and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding two thousand
1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 3, p. 142.
2 32 Am. Jur. 1034.

8 36 C.J. 856 and 883.
4 State v. Bryant, 4 N.C. 249 (1815).
6 Woodring v. Territory, 14 Okla. 250, 78 Pac. 85 (1904).
6 Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. 254 (1888); Commonwealth v. White, 133 Pa. 182
(1890); Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201, 23 At!. 896 (1892).
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dollars ($2,000), or to undergo imprisonment, by separate or solitary
confinement at labor not exceeding five (5) years, or both."1
This statute gives no definition of the term "larceny" used therein, so, as
in the case of many other Pennsylvania statutes, the common law rules apply.
Thus, the requirement of value, as shown above, is still very much a part of the
crime of larceny in this state.

What Does the Word "Value" Mean?
The meaning of "value" in early times when the law of larceny was developed
selems not to have been the same as we would think of it today. 8 In our modern
conception, we should probably describe anything that would command a price as
a thing of value. We would call the intrinsic worth of something its value. But in
earlier times it seems to have been thought that "valuable" implied serious, practical importance as opposed to mere fancy or amusement.9 For this reason, animals
not fit for food or the production of food were not the subj'ect of larceny at early
common law. As a result of this concept of "valuable", there was no crime in the
stealing of cats, ferrets, monkeys, nightingales, parrots or canaries. Under the old
rules, things that 'evidenced title in real estate were not larcenable because they
were said to merge into the land and, therefore, possess no value. Today, however, with the modern concept of value, these things have been made the subject of

larceny by statute or court decision in most jurisdictions. 10
What Is The Measure of Value?
In prosecutions for larceny, it first must be determined whether the property
stolen had any value; then, where there is a distinction between grand and petit
larceny, the value must be ascertained exactly to determine of what type of larceny
the defendant has been guilty. In Pennsylvania no distinction is made between petit
and grand larceny, so this note will treat only of the measure where mere value
alone is being ascertained for the purpose of satisfying the value requirement of
common law larceny.
It can hardly be said that a study of the more modern cases gives one a clear
standard which can be applied in each case so as to determine whether the property or thing involved is valuable enough to be the subject of larceny. But it can
be said that the cases no longer adhere to the old concept of the word. By value is
no longer meant something of serious practical importance but something which
is desireable to someone." This interpretation allows the many things in the common household which have no practical importance to be the subject of larceny.
The cases in the United States indicate that there are three standards which
are applied generally by the courts in determining whcther a thing is valuable
P.L. 872, § 807, 18 P.S. 4807.
8 Stephen, op. cit. supra at 143.
9 Ibid.
7 Act of June 24, 1939,

10 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 15th ed., pp. 229, 230 and 231.
11 22 Colo. L. Rev. 676.
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enough to be the subject of larceny. These are: (1) those which say that the thing
must have some market value; (2) those which say that the thing must have some
value to the owner; (3) those which say that some value to any person is sufficient.
The cases which require that the thing have a market value seem to be in
a d&cided minority, probably because this standard is more exclusive than the
other two mentioned. This standard however, has been applied in several jurisdictions. In a New Hampshire case, in 1877, the court said:
"Evidence that a thing is worth $20 to the owner does not show its
market value to be $20. To be of the market value of $20, it 2must be
capable of being sold for that sum at a fairly conducted sale."'
An Iowa court, in 1878, where the value of property was in issue in a larceny
case, said:
"Where the value of the property alleged to have been stolen is in
issue, the jury should be instructed to find as to the value of the property,
ordinary course of trade, not merely what
what it would realize in the
18
it was worth to the owner." 1
In 1926, an Oregon court said that the value of equipment that had been
smashed and carried away, for the purposes of larceny, was the market valu'e
before the equipment was smashed. 14 It can be seen from a study of the cases
which use this market value standard, that this test is applied most frequently
where the courts, while apparently determining if a thing is valuable enough to be
the subject of larceny, are in reality ascertaining the value for the purpose of
grading the degree of the offense of larceny. The Texas Criminal Code has set
a $20 statutory value minimum limit in one of the larceny statutes, and when this is
involved, the courts say the value is the market value at the time and place it
was stolen, and if it had no market value, the cost it would take to replace it. 1
The second measure of value, which requires value to the owner, is more
frequently cited than the preceeding one, and also opens the field of larceny to
more things. The cases which apply this standard seem to indicate that any value,
however slight, to the owner, will satisfy the value requirement of larceny. If the
owner of the goods has been deprived of something, whether the taker can derive any benefit from it or not, the property has sufficient value.' 6 In a case which
involved the theft of a phonographic report, the court said:
"The market value is the right standard of value of property for
which there is competition. But this phonographic report was only valuable for the use that could be made of it in the case in which is was taken.
The use that may be made of property gives to it its value. If it can b-e used
by many, it will have a market value; if but by one, it will be valuable to
him alone. And the value to him is the one that must be taken in tsti12 State v. James, 58 N.H. 67 (1877).
13 The State v. Smith, 48 Iowa 595 (1878).
14 State v. Albert, 117 Ore. 179, 242 Pac. 1116 (1926).
15 Childress v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. Rep. 215, 241 S.W. 1029 (1922); Givens v. State, 143 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 277, 158 S.W.2d 535 (1942).
16 People v. Phelps, 49 How. Prac. 437 (1875).
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mating its worth. In such a case, it is sufficient to prove the market value
to that person."17
Some courts have been very liberal in their setting of this standard. It has
been said that if a thing has value to the owner, though to no one else, to steal it is
larceny. 18 One eminent authority follows this in saying,

"...

it is enough if the

owner has been deprived of a valuable thing."' 19
The third standard is very much like the second, but it does not require that
the value be to the owner of the property, though in almost all cases that have
been decided by courts applying this measure, the value has in fact been to the
owner. An old North Carolina case, in quashing an indictment for larceny, said,
"An indictment which charges a person with stealing a thing destitute of both intrinsic and artificial value cannot be supported." 20 It is quite possible that had this
court been finding someone guilty of larceny, it would not have announced a standard for the determination of value quite as liberal as this one. Here the object
was devoid of value, thus, the court didn't need to say to whom the subject of
larceny need be valuable since the thing was of value to no one. In another case,
the court set aside a verdict, where the "value of the corn was neither alleged nor
proven.' '21 This statement, however, cannot be relied upon, for the same reason
as in the previous case, as intending to announce a standard for finding one
guilty of larceny. In one case which involved a statute which said, "If anyone shall
commit the crime of larceny, .... ", the court said that the subject matter of larceny
must have value, however small.2 2 A further study of the cases which seem to set
up this liberal standard of "any value" shows that, in nearly all of the cases, the
court was speaking generally and was not purporting to fix a method for measuring the value of larceny. 23 Some courts have used the phrase "slight intrinsic
value" when discussing the requirement of value in larceny. 24 Again it cannot be ascertained whether the court actually was holding that the thing need not be of
value to the owner as long as it possesses that intrinsic value, or whether the
court was merely speaking in generalities.
How Much Value?
Regardless of which of the above standards the court adopts, it still has the
question of how much value must the thing have to be the subject of larceny.
When considering this question, the law must remember the doctrine de minimis
17 Territory v. McGrath, 5 Utah 525, 17 Pac. 116 (1888).

18 Ayers v. State, 3 Ga. App. 305, 59 S.E. 924 (1907); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 14 Gray 376,
77 Am. Dec. 333 (1860).
19 32 Am. Jur. 984.
20 See n. 4, supra.
21 Ellison v. State, 25 Tex. App. 328, 8 S.W. 462 (1888).
22 State v. Broom et al., 135 Ore. 641, 297 Pac. 340 (1931).
2, Commonwealth v. Weston et al., 241 Mass. 131, 135 N.E. 465 (1922); People v. Gonzales
et al., 62 Cal. App.2d 74, 144 P.2d 605 (1944); People v. Dunsworth, 323 111. App. 470, 56
N.E.2d 52 (1944); Payne v. People, 6 Johns. 103 (1810).
24 People v. Gonzales et al., 62 Cal. App.2d 74, 144 P.2d 605 (1944) ; People v. Dunsworth, 323
Ill. App. 470, 56 N.E.2d 52 (1944); Payne v. People, 6 Johns. 103 (1810).
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non curat lex. If the law held that anything with value, however insignificant,
could be the subject of larceny, it is conceivable that it would be a crime to dip
your pen in another's ink well, or to pick acorns off another's lawn to throw at
something.2 5 Since it is very impractical, few courts have set up a definite value
minimum; and what little has been said on the matter has usually been in the
form of dicta. The question has been answered indirectly by the courts each time
they have said that a particular thing is or is not the subject of larceny. In a few
scattered opinions it has been emphasized that the amount of the value is highly
unimportant. The courts seem to feel that the guilty intent in larceny is more
important than the worth of the thing stolen. Becaus'e of this feeling, these statements have been made: "It is sufficient, however, it is said, if it be worth less
than the smallest coin known to the law; ' ' 26 "Blank checks worth six cents can be
the subject of larceny;"

27

"To be a subject of larceny, . . . (it must have value)

. . . but the least value is sufficient;" 28 "Robbery (which includes the crime of
larceny at common law) may be committed of a penny as well as a pound." 29 It
is interesting to note that in the case last quoted from, the court said that a pinch of
tobacco had "no appreciable value" and thus the crime of robbery was not committed.8 0
Thus, it can be seen that, in spite of the de minimis doctrine, the courts have
generally said that the question of how much value the thing has is not too pertinent so long as it has some value. It could be that the law reasons that, while the subject matter of the crime might be a trifle, the guilty mind that accompanies this
may not be and, therefore, there is a good purpose in not setting any regular or
flexible minimum worth standard for the subject matter of the crime of larceny.
Some Cases Involving The Value of Specific Things
After having considered what the courts look for when they are determining
whether a thing is valuable enough to be the subject of larceny, it would be interesting to note some of the cases which have ruled on this issue as to specific property.
Dogs, as domestic pets, at common law, could not be the subjects of larceny.-'
It was said that they had no value. More modern thinking, however, has realized
that a dog does have the required value, and the courts now will sustain convictions for the larceny of a dog. This trend started when the local governments
began to tax dogs as property and to punish the theft of the dog's collar. The
courts then reasoned that if a dog had enough property to be taxed, it certainly
could be the subject of larceny.8 2 Pennsylvania courts have said that because dogs
Kenny, op. cit. supra. at 229.
Wolverton v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 909 (1881).
Keller v. United States, 168 Fed. 697 (1909).
American Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 2, p. 750, cited in People v. Dunsworth, 323 Il. App. 470,
56 N.E.2d 52 (1944).
29 Commonwealth v. White, 133 Pa. 182 (1890).
30 See n. 29, supra.
31 Ingham, Law of Animals, p. 57.
32 Meekins v. Simpson, 176 N.C. 130, 96 S.E. 894 (1918); Commonwealth v. Flynn, 188 N.E.
627, 285 Mass. 136 (1934) ; State v. Weekly, 76 Ohio App. 199, 63 N.E.2d 558 (1945).
25
26
27
28
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are taxed by statute, they have value and can be the subject of larceny.88 A specific
statute now expressly makes dogs the subject of larceny.8 4
Bank checks have been involved in some very interesting litigation which
turned upon the issue of whether they have enough value to be the subject matter
of larceny. Some jurisdictions say that the checks, whether blank or not, can be
the subject of larceny. 3 5 Unpaid bank checks have been held to be valuable.3 6
These courts seem to feel that the value of the paper in itself satisfies the value
requirement, even if the check is of no use to the thief. In State v. Hinton, decid'ed
in Oregon in 1910, there had been a theft of a check indorsed by the payee with
the words "pay to the order of" and his name underneath this with a space in
between. The court said:
"A check indorsed by the payee with the words 'pay to the order
of' with his signature written immediately below but with a sufficient
blank space to permit the writing therein of the name of the holder, made
the check payable to the bearer and negotiable by delivery under B.
& C. Comp. § 4436, providing that an indorsement in blank specifies no
indorsee, and may be negotiated by delivery, so that it cannot be said that
this is not the subject of larceny because it has no commercial value."8 7
It has also been held that, although they have no value without the owner's
indorsement, traveler's checks can be the subject of larceny because of the possi8
bility that they can be forged.3
An interesting question as to value arises where the thing which was stolen
is illegal for one reason or another. Does this have the value requisite for a conviction of larceny? This problem has been handled at least twice in the California
courts. In 1915, it was said that a lottery ticket, if considered as a piece of paper,
can be the subject of larceny. 39 In 1944, the question was presented again. The court
said:
"The lottery ticket which was the subject matter of the larceny charged in the present case had no relative value save, as affirmatively alleged in the information, as the evidence of a debt due from an enterprise
which was denounced by law and which apparently existed and was
conducted by its promoters in defiance of the law. It is a well-settled
principle that an obligation which exists in defiance of a law which
denounces it has, in the eye of the law, neither validity nor value. Considered as a piece of paper, a lottery ticket might possess some slight
intrinsic value which would suffice, insofar as the element of value in
the crime of petty theft is concerned, to make the unlawful taking of it
33 Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201, 23 At. 896 (1892).
84 Act of May 11, 1921, P.L. 522, § 23, 3 P.S. 482.
35 See n. 27, supra.
36 People v. Quiel et al., 68 Cal. App.2d 674, 157 P.2d 446 (1945).
37 State v. Hinton, 56 Ore. 428, 109 Pac. 24 (1910) ; for further information on this problem see
Uniform Commercial Code 3-111, comment 2, and 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 27.
38 Allen v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 376, 42 S.E.2d 838 (1947).
39 People v. Caridis, 29 Cal. App. 166, 154 Pac. 1061 (1915).
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petty theft, but defendants
herein were not charged with petty theft of
' 40
a piece of paper. "
During the days of prohibition, several cases appeared in prohibition states
where the defendant had stolen liquor, which in itself was illegal. The courts usually acknowledged the fact that the liquor itself was illegal, and in answer to the
claim that the liquor had no value because it could not be sold, they said that it
was in interstate commerce 4 and therefore had Value, or that it had value to the
governmnent when it was confiscated. 42 A Pennsylvania statute 43 says, "No property
" Actights shall exist in any liquor . . . illegally manufactured or possessed ..
cording to the weight of authority, this does not mean that the liquor is not larcen44
able.
In addition to the subjects above discussed, courts have ruled that many
other varied things are valuable enough to be the subject of larceny. For instance,
47
a photograph, 45 some rationing coupons,46 some postage stamps not yet issued
48
and the flowers on a grave, before they are withered, have supported convictions
for larceny. On the other hand, a receipt for a debt, illegally obtained and therefore void,4 9 and a one-half ten-shilling bill of currency of the state "0 were held
not to have sufficient value.
Where a Statute Is Involved
Most states today have some statutes which in some way affect the crime of
larceny. As we have seen, Pennsylvania has a general statute, which, in effect,
reenacts the common law. Other states also have general statutes similar to this.
But, in addition to this, special larceny statutes are very common. They serve to
leave no doubt in the law as to certain things which were not, usually, the subjects of larceny at common law. Pennsylvania has several statutes 51of this nature.
52
For instance, we have laws which deal with larceny by an 'employee, of fixtures,
of electrical equipment, 53 by a bailee,5 4 of coal and iron ore, 55 of growing

40 People v. Gonzales et al., 62 Cal. App.2d 74, 144 P.2d 605 (1944).
41 Wiley v. State, 17 Ala. App. 7, 81 So. 343 (1919); Gates v. State, 20 Ga. App. 171, 92 S.E.
974 (1917).

42 People v. Otis, 235 N.Y. 421, 139 N.E. 562, 69 L. Ed. 465 (1923).
43 Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, art. VI, § 601, 47 P.S. 6-601.
44 52 C.J.S. 813.

45
4,
47
48
49
50
51

Commonwealth v. Weston et al., 241 Mass. 131, 135 N.E. 465 (1922).
People v. Dunsworth, 323 111. App. 470, 56 N.E. 52 (1944).
Jolly v. United States, 170 U.S. 402, 18 Sup. Ct. 624, 42 L. Ed. 1085 (1898).
Busier v. State, 181 Tenn. 675, 184 S.W.2d 24 (1944).
People v. Loomis, 4 Denio 380 (1847).
See n. 4, supra.
Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 815, 18 P.S. 4815.

52 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 813, 18 P.S. 4813.

58 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 814, 18 P.S. 4814.
54 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 816, 18 P.S. 4816.
55 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 812, 18 P.S. 4812.
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property, 56 of bank bills, securities, and documents5 7 and of veterans' grave markers. 58 None of these statutes mentions the requirement of value at all.
The question that arises occasionally in a larceny case under a staute of this
nature is: Does this statute require that the subject matter have value, or does it
make this particular thing the subject of larceny whether it has any value at all?
Pennsylvania has never had to answer this query, but a few other jurisdictions have.
Some have said that no value is necessary, while others have maintained that value
still must be shown. For instance, Oklahoma and Utah set up statutes making
the stealing of cattle larceny. The Oklahoma court, in a case where value was in
question, said that value was not necessary to the crime under the statute. 59 Utah's
court said the fact that the legislature made this offense larceny without reference
to value, makes value immaterial.6 0 Under a statute which made the theft of a
dog larceny, it was held that value need not be shown. 61 In 1946, in Lotto et al. v.
United States,62 the court held that used gasoline ration coupons remained the
property of the government and, therefore, under a statute which made the stealing of any government property a crime, the court said that value need not be shown.
This case would seem to indicate that the federal larceny statutes do not require that
value be shown. This was not quite certain in the early 1920's. In 1920, in a case
involving the theft of a government paycheck, brought under a statute making it
a crime to steal "property of the United States", the court said value must be
shown.63 Two years later, in a case brought under a similar statute for the stealing
of "personal property of the United States," the court said that value was not an
element of the crime. 64 This case was approved in the Lotto case. It does not seem
that these cases actually conflict, because both found the defendant guilty. The only
difference is that the court showed the value, while the other did not, though it
was apparent that the letters stolen did have value.
Some courts insist that the value requirement is still necessary under the
statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court, in an indictment under a statute making
the theft of a bill of exchange or other thing in action, larceny, said that value
must be shown. 65 The California Court of Appeals, where the indictment was
under a statute making "a written instrument" the subject of larceny, held that
they were, therefore, undelivered
where the defendant got two deeds by fraud,
66
and valueless; thus, there was no larceny.
&,6Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 811, 18 P.S. 4811.
57 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 808, 18 P.S. 4808.
58 Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 814.1, added July 27, 1953, P.L. 625, § 1, 18 P.S. 4814.1.
59 See n. 5, supra.
60 State v. Bates, 25 Utah 1, 69 Pac. 70 (1902).
61 Commonwealth v. Flynn, 285 Mass. 136, 188 N.E. 627 (1934).
62 157 F.2d 623 (1946).
63 Clark v. United States, 268 Fed. 328 (1920).
64 Donegan v. United States, 287 Fed. 641, 67 L. Ed. 495 (1922).
65 See n. 37, supra.
66 People v. Sewall, 90 Cal. App. 476, 265 Pac. 1040 (1928).
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The answer to the question of whether value is necessary to a conviction under
one of these special larceny statutes seems to lie in this observation. Why would
a legislature make something the subject of statutory larceny if it did not think that
it had some value? It seems that the very reason that they make the object larcenable is because it is valuable. This makes sense and s'eems to be a logical answer
to this question. If the courts find that something which is apparently covered by
one of these statutes to be without value, then it, in all probability, is not actually
th' type of thing that the statute intended to be the subject of larceny, and the
statute is not applicable. For instance, in the case above referred to where the
defendant had obtained two deeds by fraud, the fact that the deeds were obtained
by fraud made them undelivered, and, in fact, they were not deeds at all, so they
were not covered by the special larceny statute.
A study of the development of the requirement that the subject matter of
larceny have value has shown that our modern concepts and ideas have altered,
sometimes radically, the common law definition of the word value. But it is also
evident that, even under statutes which make the theft of specific things larceny,
the requirement that the thing have value, though measured by more modern
norms, is still very much a part of the law of larceny. In the words67 of Lord Holt,
"I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in time may settle.'
Sidney D. Kline, Jr.
Member of the Middler Class
67 Coggs v. Bernard,' 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).

